The peace process in the Balkans. Assembly of Western European Union Forty-First Ordinary Session (Second Part) Document 1540, 15 October 1996 by Roseta, Mr.
rlg+
Assembly of Western European Union
DOCUMENT 1540 15 October 1996
FORTY-FIRST ORDINARY SESSION
(Second part)
The peace process in the Balkans
REPORT
submitted on behalf of the Polrtrcal Committee
by Mr Roseta, Rapporteur
ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
43, avenue du Presrdent-Wilson, 757'75Pars Cedex 16 - Tel. 0l 53.67.22.00
Document 1540 15 October 1996
The peace process in the Balkans
REPORTl
submitted on behalf of the Political Committee'
by Mr Roseta, Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION
on the peace process rn the Balkans
EXPLANATORY MEMORAND UM
submrtted by Mr Roscta, Rapporteur
I lntroductron
I An uncertam future for Bosrua and Herzegovina
l. Thc clectrons of 14 September 1996
2. The drfficult task of creatrng lornt urstrtutions rn Bosrua and
Hcrzcgolrna
3 The rolcs of Belgradc and Zagreb
4 Thc hftrng ofsanclons andthe consequenccs
m Scarch for an appropnate strateg,v for complcting the peace proccss
I A common concept to glve Bosrua sclf-sustarned stabrlrtl'
2 Eastem Slal'orua and the Prevlaka perunsula
3 Kosovo, Vo.yvodrna and Sandjak
4. Confidence- and sccuntr.building measures
[V Conclusions
1. Adopted unanrmouslv bt' the Committee.
2 t\lembers of the Comnttttee. Mr de Putg (Charrman). Mr Rosela (Vrce-Charrman). MM Antretter, dc Assis,
Blaauw, Sir Andreu'Bou'dcn. MM Buhler, Caputo (Alternate: tlrata). MM Cronr. Dras, Ehrmann. Evskens.
Fassino (Alternate Benvenutr), Mrs Frscher. Mr Irmer, Sir Russell Johnston, MM Jurgens. Kasperert,
Lord krkhtll. MM haprs. l'an der Lrnden (Alternatc L-erbeek), MM de Lrpkowskt Van der Maclen.
Martinez Casan (Alterrate'. llartinez), Mr Pottakis (Altcrnate -\[aggnas). MM Pozzo, Puche Rodriguez.
Recoder (Alternatc Sole Tura). MM Rrpprnger, Rodeghiero. Roko!'llos. Settltnger. Sir Keith Spced (Alternate:
I)at,ts). MM Urbarn. Vrngon (Alternatc: tlbout),Mr Zierer
Associate mentber Mr Godal
N.B. Tfte nanrcs of those takmg part tn lhe vote are pnntecl rn rtaltcs.
DOCUMENT 15+O
Droft Recommendation
on the peace process in the Balkans
The Asscmblr'.
(t) Notrng s'rth satisfaction that the process for bnngrng hfc back to normal ts contrtutng stcp by' step m
Bosrua and Herzegovma and in the other successor countnes of former Yugoslavra,
0r) Convrnced nevertheless that Bosrua and Herzegonna wrll strll need substantral exlemal asslstance
before rt can conduct its oun affarrs unarded.
|tt) Strcssng that. follorirng thc electrons held on 14 Septembcr 1996 ur Bosrua and Herzegovma. thc
essentnl task nou' conslsts of scttrng up and runrung the.lornt pohtrcal institutrons for uluch the countnJs
Constrtutron makes provlslon.
6v) RecallLng m ths connectron that rt had alrcady expressed rts convrctron m Recommcndatron 598 that
for the peacc process to succeed, rt u'ould be vrtal to cnsure that the Repubhc of Bosrua and Herzegor.ma
could be run smoothlv on the basrs of a reburldrng of the economr'. freedom of mor,'cment and a spint of
cooperatron betu'ccn all the vanous cntrtrcs and ethruc groups u'hrch make up thc country'.
(v) Welcomng thc conclusron of the agreement on arrns control at sub-regtonal level provrdcd for bv
Articlc IV of Anncr l-B to the agrcemcnt on regronal stabrhsatron.
(r,) Noturg ne"'ertheless that the marn objcctr!'es. conccrrung the mrlrtary and ctul aspects of thc peace
agreements. have not lct been actuevcd, m partrcular.
mrne-cleanng.
- 
the conclusron of an agreement on arms control at regional lel'el under thc ausprces of the OSCE,
for uluch Artrcle V of Arurex l-B to the Dalton Accords makes pro!'rsron.
- 
rcal progress on confidence- and secuntr-burldmg mcasures ur Bosrua and Herzegolrna (see
paragraph 3 (a) and (b/ of Recommcndatron 598).
- 
thc rctum of refugees and drsplaced persons to therr homes,
- 
freedom of movement and resrdence tfuoughout Bosrua and Herzcgol'rna.
(w) Welcomurg thc progress made m demrlrtansrng castem Slavorua and the promrsmg outlook for a
peaceful retum of tlls reglon to Croatran sol'erergntr'.
(wr) Strongll dcsrnng a farr arrangemcnt to be reached rcgardmg the Prcvlaka pemnsula:
6x) Concemed. horvcvcr. that there has bccn lrttlc rmpror,'ement rn the srtuatron rn Kosovo, Volvodrna and
Sandlak,
(x) Notrng that. subsequent to the hftrng of thc econorruc sanctrons rmposed b1'the Uruted Natrons on the
Federal Rcpubhc of Yugoslar,ra and the Repubhka Srpska, WEU decided to cnd rts Danube morutonng
operatron and that NATO and WEU ended opcration Sharp Guard.
(x, Fcanng that the WEU Council's decisron to end the mandate of the WEU pohcc force ur Mostar urll
senously rnpedc the smooth ruruung of the toun's;ornt admrustratron,
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(rrr) Notrng the drfficulties the Uruted Nations has encountered ur estabhshmg an effcctrvc rnternational
police forcc rn Bosrua and Hcrzegor.'rna and eastem Slavorua,
(xut) Murdful that NATO has not 1'et taken a decision on thc possrble retention of a mrlitary presenco m
Bosrua and Herzegonna aftcr the erpiry of IFOR's mandate.
(nv) Shocked that manl' persons urdrctcd for rvar crimes. rncludurg Mr Karadzrc and Mr Mladrc, have not
y'ct appeared beforc the Intematronal Tnbunal m The Haguc;
(ru) Convurcedthat WEU must plal'an actrve role ur all the efforts made bv thc ntemational commuruh to
appll' appropnate prcssure on the vanous rnterested partles u-rth a vrerv to acluevrng all the oblectrves set forth
ur the peace agrecmcnts.
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COTNCIL
I Makc strong rcpresentatlons to the OSCE to press for the early operung of the negotiations on
arms control at regronal level provrded for in Articlc V of Anncx l-B to the Dalton Accords and. more
specrficalll'. for the desrgnation of a special representative responsrble for the negotratrons and for the
establishmcnt of the cornmrsslon mentioned in that artrcle;
2. Act upon paragraph 6 of Assemblv Rccommendatron 598 by' askrng thc European Unron to
envlsage extended assrstancc rvith the reconstruction of Bosnra and Herzegovina and the resettlement of
rcfugees. ensuring that such assistance rs shared equitably'betu'ecn the various parts of the Repubhc.
3 Be represented at the Conference of the Peace Implcmcntatron Counctl to be held m Pans and
London, and also at all meetings of the Council of the European Unron convcncd to discuss the peace
proccss rn the Balkans;
4 Follorv up paragraph3 (a) and (b) of Assembll'Recommendatron 598, to whrch rt has not,vet
rcplied.
5 Propose that the United Nations partly' replacc the international pohce task force (IPTF) by' a
more substantral WEU pohce force.
6 Urge NATO rapidly to rcqucst the Unrtcd Natrons for a fresh mandate enabhng rt to set up a
post-IFOR mrlrtary force in Bosrua and Herzegovlna. rn rvhrch an Amerrcan contrngent of ground troops
u'ould partrcrpate at least untrl the elections schedulcd for 1998
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Exp lan at o r 1' M e mo r an du m
(submilted by Mr Roseta, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
I Ten months after the cessatton of
hostrlrtres in all thc rcglons and successor statcs
of former Yugoslavia, the ovcrrrding problem to
be resolved conslsts of rvorkmg out hou' a nc\\'
stable and pcaceful polrtrcal order can be madc
vrable throughout thrs area of Europe in uhrch
the sheer drvcrsrtv of ethnic commuruttes and
rehgrons. combined u'tth polrtrcal svstems
domrnatcd bv successive foretgn pon'ers. hal'e
been the cause of numerous confltcts doxn the
ages.
2 The marn purpose of thrs report is
thcrcfore txofold (a) to assess thc political
srtuation in Bosnra and Herzegovtna follorung
thc electrons held on 14 September 1996. and
also ln all the successor states of former
Yugoslavra and 1b) to propose. on the basrs of
that assessment. appropnate polrtrcal optlons
urth a vierv to accomphshing the extremell'
drffrcult task of ensunng lastrng peacc rn the
region as a uhole
II. An uncertain future for Bosnia and
Herxegovina
3. Of thc five countnes that previousll' made
up formcr Yugoslavta 
- 
Slol'enta. Croatra. the
Federal Repubhc of Yugoslavta. the Former
Yugoslav Repubhc of Macedonra (FYROM) and
Bosnra and Hcrzegonna, tt rs the viabilrtv of the
latter that rarses most conccrn Wrth the first
clectrons since thc end of hosttltttcs hal'rng been
held on 14 Septembcr 1996 and the crptn' date
of IFOR's mandate approachrng. the archrtects of
thc Dalton Accords are faced urth the task of
contrnumg to pursue thc concept underlf ing the
Accords, namelr'. a multr-ethnic countn'
consrstlng of trvo entrtrcs uhich is supposed to be
run on the basrs of a complex constttuttonal
structure that rs someu'hat fragrle and artrficral
l. The elections of 14 September 1996
4 There rs no doubt that the results of the
elections hcld on 14 Septcmber confirmed u'hat
most analvsts had predrcted rn the hght of thc
polrtrcal climate that held su'af in the run-up to
the electrons. in all parts of the country'. the
"natronahst" parties came ln far ahead of all the
other politrcal groups Thrs had tmmcdrate
consequences on the composttton of the countrl''s
presrdencl, uhich. under the Constttutton of
Bosnra and Herzegovrna, rs a collccttve
presidencv u'rth three membcrs onc Bosnian and
one Croat. each dlrectll-elected rn the territorl'of
the Federatron, and one Serb. dtrectlv elected rn
ths ternton, of the "Repubhka Srpska"
5 The Constrtution also strpulates that
members of the prcsrdencv are to appornt one of
therr number to act as chatrman. But for the first
tcrm of the presrdencl'. thrs apporntment falls to
thc member u'ho obtained the highest number of
votes Thus. accordrng to the results of the
electrons, u'hrch rvere ccrttfied after a trvo-rveek
delal' bv the OSCE. uhrch \\'as responsrble for
organlslng them. the Bosntan Presrdent. Ahla
Izctbcgovic of the Mushm Party of Democrattc
Actron (SDA) became "Charrman of the
collcctrve presidencr'" after comtng first tn thc
electrons follox-ed bv thc Serb. Momctlo
Kra.lrsnrk. and the Croat. Kresrmrr Zubak.
6. Mr Izctbcgovic rs perhaps the only person
to have fought for the preservatlon of a multr-
ethnrc Bosnia and Herzegovtna How'ever.
because of the natronahst tendcncres of most of
the other polrtrcal groups. thc Partl' of
Dcmocratic Actron (SDA) 
- 
u'hrch
Mr Izetbegovrc founded and rvhrch to begrn urth




domrnated bv rts natronahst \\1ng.
Mr Izetbegovic can nonctheless be consrdered as
the marn polrtrcal plaver determined to rc-unrfr
hrs drvrded countn'
7 . Thcre is vcry lrttle slgn of such
determrnatron in the declared posrtrons and
intentrons of hrs Serb and Croat fellori' membcrs
of the presrdeno', Mr Kralrsnrk and Mr Zubak
Mr Kralrsnrk. also knoun as thc "hau,k of Palc".
plaved an actrve part in devising the programmc
of "ethnic clcansrng" and throughout his electton
campaign advocated a separatlst programme in
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total contradrctron of the Daton Accords,
clarmmg that "the Serbs u'ant therr oun statc"l
8 Thc commrtment of Mr Zubak, the Croat
member of the presrdencr,, to the proper mnnlng
of the Repubhc of Bosrua and Herzegovina also
leaves room for doubt in vrov of hrs statcments
dunng the elcction campalgn urging Croats to
strengthen therr hnks riith the motherland.
Croatra2,
9. In vieu' of the above. it u,ill be very
difficult for the presidency to take the decrsions
necessan' for estabhshing a multr-ethnic state
along the hnes laid doun rn the Dayton Accords
and the problems that he ahead arc further
comphcated bv the shortcomings observed during
the preparatron and holdrng of the elections,
s,hrch \\'ere strongll' cntrcrsed by' many
obscrvcrs Thcrr l'ahdrtv u'as drsputed by, among
othcrs. the Intcrnatronal Crrsrs Group (ICG)
charred b1'former US Senator Mrtchell.
l0 In thrs context rt should be remembered
that, at a mcctrng m Gcncva on 14 August, thc
US Secretan- of State. Warren Christopher,
agreed rrrth Presrdents Mrlosevic. Tud.lman and
Izetbegovic on the condrtions for organrsing
democratrc. frcc and farr electrons that rvould
lead to the establishment of the joint instrtutions
necessan' for the proper runrung of the state's
structures
I l. Wrth specrfic regard to the elections, the
partrcipants at the meeting agreed the following
provlslons mter alta
"- Conditions for free and farr elections lr.r11
be assurcd throughout Bosrua and
Herzegolrna In partrcular, free
movement of persons throughout the
countn' and the absencc of violencc,
thrcats. or rntrmrdatron of any krnd wrll be
guaranteed b1'entrt_v and local authontrcs.
The exercrse ofthe nght to vote does not
affect the fundamental nght of refugees
and drsplaced persons to retum to their
homes.
Access to medra urll be rmproved for all
political groups and rr all commuruties
Freedom of assemblv. unrestricted
Le l[onde, l9 September 1996
Le ][onde, l9 September 1996
regstratron and voturg, and stnct
adhcrcncc to regulations set forth b1,thc
OSCE urll also be mamtamed.
- 
Authontres at all lcvels wrll be
mstructed to coopcratc m cver)' step of
the electoral process, urcludrng freedom
of thc domestrc and rntemational medra to
report the elcctrons
- 
Persons rndrcted for rvar cnmes urll not
partrcrpate rn the election process i, arl'
\\'ay The 18 Jull' agreement to remove
all rndrcted persons from power wrll be
rmplemented m even' respect.
The arrest of all mdrcted persons remains
an rmportant goal and a critrcal step in thc
process of rmplementatron of the Dayton
agrecment as u'cll as reconcrliatron and
rcncual
- 
Takrng note of the agrccmcnt on mcdia
access reached on 2 Jure 1996, rn
Geneva. the Partres rcaffirm ther
agreement to support fully the Open
Broadcast netu'ork prolect and other
medra support prqects berng coordrnated
through the Office of the flgh
Representative and the OSCE."
12 Noturthstandrng the above, special bus
servlces follou'rng specrfic routes, organised b1'
the OSCE. u'ere the only u'av of ensuring
freedom of movement durrng the elections,
partrcularll' across the inter-entitv boundarl, line.
But rnstead of the estimated 100 000 or so Croat
and Mushm refugees. onh' about l3 500 peoplc
crossed Serb terrrton'. u'hrle of the estimated
20 000 Serbs. onl1. about I 500 voted rn the
ternton' of the Mushm-Croat Fcdcratron3.
Voters \\'ere frrghtcncd of movmg around
becausc even' l'ehtcle headrng tor,''ards thc
boundary' hnc bet"r een the entltles \\'as
mcthodicalll' checked b1' IFOR, rvhich drd not
really'make for proper freedom of movement. In
addrtron, mosl Serb refugees drd not want to go
back to u'hers thev had prevrousll, lived because
thel' felt more at home m the Republika Srpska.
In contrast. rt appears that Muslim and Croat
refugees \rere more numerous in rvrshing to
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postponcmcnt of thc munlclpal electrons from
Scptcmber to November deterred manv Bosnlan
and Croat rcfugees from movrng mto Serb-held
ternton'to votc for the mavor of thcrr choice
l3 The rrght of refugees and displaced
persons to rcturn to thcrr homes, together urth
freedom of movemcnt and resrdence contmue to
be rmportant and difficult tasks. rvhrch can onlv
be accomphshed in the medium term.
14. Progress still has to be made on
independent and central media outlets and
especialll' televrsron statrons since the
transmitters rn Saralevo. Mostar and Pale are
almost exclusivelv undcr the mfluence of the
respectrve natronahst partrcs lt rvas not until
7 September. lust a u'eek bcfore the electrons.
that "Brldt TV" 
- 
an rndepcndcnt tclevrsron
channel supportcd b1' the European Unron 
-
startcd broadcastrng natronurdc
15 Persons sought b1' the Intcrnatronal War
Cnmes Trrbunal u'ere not ehgrble to vote on
l4 September and thc l4 August agreemcnt
alrcadr rcferred to stated that thcrr arrest by the
Tnbunal \\'as an rmportant goal rn the process of
rmplementatron of the Darton Accords But
neither Mr Karadzrc nor Mr Mladic has been
arrested to datc and rt is absolutelv scandalous
that the former had no problem rvhatsoever u,hen
rt came to votmg m the electrons
16 Hou'ever, desprte all the shortcommgs and
even the attempts at fraud detccted during the
prcparatlon. organrsatron and holding of the
14 September elcctrons. there is no pomt at this
stage du-elhng on thc questron of rvhethcr rt u'as
too earlv for thcm to bc hcld They,took placc
u'rthout major rncrdcnt and the OSCE dcclared
that the results n'erc "rmperfcct and dcbatable but
on the u'hole acceptablc"a Horvever, thc OSCE
decrded to postponc the munrcrpal clectrons to the
cnd of November 1996
17 The rnternatronal communrtl, must nou'
drarv all the consequences of rvhat rt has and has
not decrded It decrded to hold elections rvrthout
voters knourng u'hat rvould happen aftcr the end
of the IFOR mandate Some people consider that
thrs u-as the reason u'hv manv of them voted for
the so-called natronahst partles. On the other
I Europe No
I Octobcr 1996
hand, the opposltlon partles obtarned qurtc a
largc number of votes Dcsprtc thc contrnumg
dangcr prcsented b1'centrrfugal forccs rn various
parts of thc countn'. thc rnternatronal commurutr'
has no optron other than to pursue the coursc lard
dorrn rn thc peace agreements and consohdate
polrtrcal rcsolve to achreve unitv For rf the
polrtical forccs x'orkrng agamst the constructron
of a unrfied Bosnra and Herzegovlna \\'erc to get
their uar'. a fresh conflrct clarmmg I'et more
vrctims u'ould be rnevrtable.
2. The dfficult task of ueatingjoint institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina
l8 Thc rnternatronal communitv must
therefore look upon thc clections as a first crucral
step rn startrng the u'ork that nccds to be done to
sct up thc 
.;ornt lnstltutrons for uhrch the
Constrtutron makcs provrsron. rn partrcular thc
prcsrdcncr'. govcrnmcnt and parhamcnt It lvrll
have to be unanrmous and determrncd m rts
rcsoh'e to carn, out thrs cxtrcmcly difficult task
tf rt rs to ol'ercome the ambrguitres and cven
contradrctrons rn the Constrtutron of Bosnia and
Hcrzegovrna as set forth in Annex 4 to the peace
agreements
19. The Contact Group has grven Mr Bildt a
remit to drau' up a plan of action to thrs end
The first meeting of the collectrve presidencl',
rr-hrch rvas held rn a motel near Saralevo, rvas the
rcsult of a laborious compromlsc reached after
protracted negotratrons, rn partrcular u,ith the
Serb srdc But the huge obstaclcs strll to be
overcome came to the fore again u'hen
Mr Kralrsnrk. thc Scrb member of the collcctive
presrdcncr'. bo1'cotted the ccrcmonl'on 5 October
1996 to rnaugurate thc nuv rnstrtutions of Bosnra
and Herzegovrna. at u'hrch he u'as to havc s\\'orn
an oath to "defend" rts Constrtutron. (Accordrng
to some obsen'ers. the Serbs rn Palc could not
accept Mr Izetbcgovrc and Mr Mrloscvrc bemg
convcncd to a meetlng ln Parrs to cstabhsh
drplomatrc relatrons betu'een Bosnra and
Herzegovma and Belgradc).
20 Another problem area rs the division of
polrtrcal po\\'ers rvrthm central government and
the vanous rnstitutions of the state. Thrs drvisron
in fact forces thc Mushms to ccde certain
functrons to the other representatiles of the
ethnrc groups and entrtres
6822 (r s.), 30 Scptember and
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2l A number of arrangements have bccn
made to help overcome the manv obstaclcs to
settmg rn trarn the.lornt rnstitutions for uhrch thc
Constrtutron makes provrsion
r:l Saralevo rtself, Mr Brldt and
representatrves of the member countnes
of the Contact Group meet darly urth the
authonhes of Bosnia and Herzegolrna to
studv all manner of problcms;
ntematronallr'. the European Uruon has
agrccd. at Francc's prompturg, to drau'up
a strategv desrgncd to make an effective
contnbutron to the consohdatron ofpeace
m Bosrua over the ncxt t\\'o t'earst The
marn rdca behrnd tlus plan rs to make
progress step b1'step tou-ards the holdurg
of neu' electrons ur hlo vears' trme and
the establishment of stable mstttutrons6.
- 
the Peace Implementation Counctl 
- 
on
w'tuch, in addrtion to thc Contact Group
countries. Canada, Itall', Japan. Turkcl'
and the European Uruon are rcpresented 
-
is to meet on 14 Novembcr m Pans to
decrdc on the contcnt ofthe consohdatton
plan before rt rs adopted rn London earll'
m Decembcr
22 Grcat uncertalntv surrounds the purpose
the inter-entrtv boundan' hne is supposed to
serve u'rthin Bosnra and Herzcgovina Provision
for thrs boundan' dcmarcation is made in
Artrcle III of the General Framerlork Agreement
and in Annex 2 thereto Accordrng to Article III,
"thc Partres endorse the arrangements that
have been made concerrung the boundary,'
dcmarcation betu'een the tu'o entrties. thc
Fcderatron of Bosnia and Herzegovtna and
Rcpubhka Srpska" and Annex 2 strpulatcs that
"the Parties may ad.;ust thc inter-entrtl' boundarl'
line onll' by' mutual consentr'. But the texts do
not specrfl'u'hcther this boundary dcmarcatton ts
srmplv meant to establish a ltnc separatrng the
armed forces of the formor opposing facttons in
the civil \\'ar or u'hether rt rs also supposed to
delineate territorral rcsponsrbilrties ln
admmrstratrve tcrms
23 In an)' ci'cnt, onlv IFOR troops can
currentlv carn'out checks along the rvhole length
5
6
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of the boundary line and there rs no plan to
transform rt into a fronticr proper On thc
contran'. the Constrtution of the Rcpubhc of
Bosrua and Herzegovma clcarh' statcs that the
Repubhc m rts entrretv rs to continuc rts lcgal
exrstence as a state undcr international lau' and
that there rs to be full freedom of movcment of
persons, goods, scrvlces and caprtal throughout
the countn' It unequrvocalll' cxprcsses thc rrght
to hbertl' of resrdence and thc nght of refugees
and drsplaced persons freely' to return to therr
homcs of orrgrn It formallv prohibrts the
estabhshment of controls at the boundarv
betu'een thc entrtres
24. Hou'e\,'cr. m addrtron to citizenship of
Bosrua and Hcrzcgovma, the Constttutton makes
provlslon for a crtrzcnshrp of each entttr' (r e one
for the Federatron of Bosnia and Herzegovma
and one for the Republika Srpska).
25 Even though the centrahsed rnstrtutrons of
thc Rcpublic of Bosnia and Hcrzcgovtna arc
responsrble for foreign pohcr,, such responsrbrlrtv
rs not cxclusrve smce both cnttttcs of thc
Rcpubhc have the right to estabhsh spccral
parallel rclatronshrps provided thcl' are
"consistent ruth the sovcrcrgntv and territorral
integrrtl, of Bosnra and Hcrzcgovina".
26 In addrtron, cach entrtv ma1' conclude
agreements u'rth statcs and internattonal
rnstitutions urth thc conscnt of the Parhamentarv
Asscmbll' Furthermore. all governmental
functrons and pou'ers not cxpressll' assigned in
thc Constrtutron to the institutrons of the
Rcpubhc of Bosnia and Herzegovma are to be
those of thc entrties. rihich constdcrablv
rcmforces their rolc.
27 Thcse provisrons concern, among other
thrngs. thc area of defence, s'hrch IS thc
rcsponsibilitv of the entrtres Thcre are strll three
armcd forces in the terrrtory' of the Rcpubhc.
rr-hich ls not conducive to cstabhshing the
cohesion the countn' nccds The onlv
constrtutronal link betu'een the armed forccs ts
the presidencl' of the Repubhc as dctcrmrned b1'
electrons and composed of threc members one
Bosnian. one Croat and one Scrb Under the
Constitutron. each mcmbcr of the presrdencv has,
b1' vrrtue of thc office, civtltan command
authoritl' ovcr armcd forces.
28 Thc Constrtutron lavs dou,n that "neither
entrty shall thrcatcn or use force against the other
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entit)', and under no crrcumstances shall anv
armed forces of erther cntrtv cntcr rnto or stav
ii'ithin the territon' of the othcr cntrtv u rthout the
consent of the government of thc lattcr and of the
Presidcno' of Bosnra and Hcrzcgovrna All
armed forces rn Bosnra and Hcrzegol'ma shall
operate consrstcntlv rrrth the sovcrcrgntv and
terrrtonal intcgntv of Bosnra and Hcrzegovina"
It also spccrfies that members of the presrdencv
arc to select a standlng committec on mrlrtary
mattcrs to coordrnate the actr,,'rtres of armcd
forces m the countn
29 It rs uhollv understandable that the
pro!'lslons rcfcrrcd to above u'ere the result of a
compromlsc u'orkcd out lust after hostrhtres in
the country u'crc brought to an end When the
Dalton Accords u,crc srgncd. that compromrse
\\'as no doubt the most all thc rntcrested partrcs
rvere able to agree to Houc'u'cr. tt rs hard to
imagme that a state can functron propcrlv x'hcn rt
has three separate armed forccs co-cxrstrng rn rts
ternton', over u'hich ccntral governmcnt has no
more than artrficial control
30 It rs alreadv provlng ven' drfficult to run
the Muslim-Croat Federatron Desprtc thc
arrangcments made to drssolve once and for all
thc self-stvled Croat state of "Herceg-Bosna"
urthrn the Fcderatron and disband its
admrnrstratrvc structures, the desrre of the Croats
rn Bosnra and Hcrzcgovina to matntarn close
hnks urth Croatra contrnucs to pose a major
problcm Mectrng rn Washrngton on l.l May'.
rcpresentatil'cs of the Croat and Mushm forces
agreed to urufi' thcrr armics u'rthrn three vears
The agreemcnt makes provlslon for a smgle
command and onc dcfence mlnlstry for thc
Federation as a u'hole But rt rvas not untrl Julv
1996 that a brll desrgned to create a Jolnt armv
u'as adopted b1'the Fedcratron's parhamcnt
3l Another aspect rs that the Unrtcd States
and Europe are strll at odds ovcr the valuc ofthc
"equrp and trarn" programme rnrtratcd b1' thc
Unrted States and some Islamrc countries. It
consrsts of provrdrng some 500 mrlhon dollars rn
mrlrtan' ard to the Mushm-Croat Federatron for
thc purpose of promotrng regional stability in the
face of thc Bosnran Serbs' fire po\\'er. Europe
has mlsgrvlngs about thrs programme and
consrders that restoring the milrtary balance in
the countn' should bc donc first and foremost
through a pohcl' of drsarmament Poland
recentlv supported thc European Unron position
bv refusmg to dehver T-72 tanks to thc
FederatronT.
32. Whilc the mam focus of drscussrons ri'ould
appear to be on problems of unrfi'rng thc armed
forces of the Mushm-Croat Federatron. thc West
ls perhaps not palmg enough attcntron to
do clopments ln the armed forces of the
Repubhka Srpska. untrl nou'under thc command
of Gcncral Mladrc. u'ho has been rndrcted for
\\.ar cnmcs bv thc Intematronal Tribunal rn The
Haguc In an rntcn,reu'u'ith the German u'ceklr'.
Der Sptegel. on 22 Julv 1996. Mr Aleksa Buha 
-
Mr Karadzrc's succcssor as leader of the Serb
Democratrc Par[' 
- 
sard Gcncral Mladic uould
remarn rn post and that thcre u'ould ncl'er be a
unrfied armv of the Rcpublic of Bosnra and
Hcrzegol'rna
33 Hou'ever, accordrng to rnformatron
appeanng in the press rn Scptcmbers. thc polrtrcal
authontres in Palc tned to rcmove Gencral
Mladrc b1'passrng a lau' to place Bosnran Serb
forces under crvrhan authontv Reports havc rt
that this attempt misfired and that most officcrs
in thc Bosnran Serb armv continue to recclvc
thcir salarres from Belgradc
3. The roles of Belgrade and Zagreb
34 The rolcs of Belgrade and Zagreb in the
futurc of Bosnra and Hcrzegovma continue to be
the sublcct of a grcat dcal of speculatron
Rcpresentatrvcs of the Slovenian Government
hal'e clearlv rmphcd that ther' \\-ere partv to
specrfic rnformatron about thc cxistence of secret
arrangements betu'een Bclgrade and Zagreb for
the partrtron of Bosnra and Hcrzcgor,'rna Manv
obsen'ers do rn fact takc thc l,reu' that the
countn''s fate depends to a largc cxtcnt on the
attrtude of Belgrade and Zagreb. u'hrch rc-
cstabhshcd drplomatic relatrons carlv tn
Scptember This. coupled rirth the antrcrpatcd
conclnsron of a peaceful arrangement betuccn
Croatra and the Federal Repubhc of Yugoslavia
on castern Slal'onra. onlv corroborates susplclon
that the presrdents of both countrres arc ln
agrccmcnt about shanng the "booty" 
- 
in this
case. Bosnra and Herzegovmae
7 Internatronal Herold Trtbune. -l September 1996
8 Dte U'elt. 16 September 1996
9 \-eue Zurcller Ze ttung.3l August 1996
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35. Some analvsts u'ould go so far as to
consrder that Presrdent Tudlman's Croatra poses
an even greater threat to the unificatron of Bosnra
and Herzcgovma because Zagrcb u'ould have a
far greater hold over thc Croat part of the
country than Belgrade u'ould hal'c over the
Repubhka Srpska'('
36 It rs thereforc up to the rntcrnatronal
communrtv rn the first rnstance, and partrcularlv
the Contact Group countncs responsrble for the
archrtecturc of the peace agreements, to shou'
that thev arc dctermrned to use every possrble
means to presen'e peacc It should not be
forgottcn that the rnternational communitv has
vanous means at rts drsposal to shou' both
Bclgrade and Zagreb. but also the entrtres of
Bosrua and Herzegovlna, that rt rs in therr orvn
mterest to sct up the countn''s lornt lnstltutlons
for rvhrch the Dalton Accords make provrsron
1. The lifting of sanctions and the consequences
37 As far as the Fcdcral Repubhc of
Yugoslavra rs concemed. it can have no greatcr
mterest than to overturn its cstrangcmcnt from
the mternatronal communrty Under thc peace
agreements. thc economic sanctrons rmposed on
the Fedcral Rcpubhc (and also on the Repubhka
Srpska) b1,the Unrted Natrons u'cre to be hfted
once and for all ten davs after certrfication ofthe
first electrons follou'rng thc end of the u'ar.
Thesc u'ere held on 14 September 1996. On
1 Octobcr the LrN Secuntv Councrl accordingly
decrded. b1'adopting Resolutron 1074. to lift the
sanctions permanentlr,', as Russra m partrcular
uished rt to do. Hor,vever. the Securrtv Council
statcd that the situatron should contmue to be
monrtored closely and sard it u'ould take
appropriate measures rf anv of the partrcs farled
to fuIfil its specific obligatrons under the Darton
Accords.
38 On anothcr front, consrderatron must also
be gven to the aspiratlons of most of the
successor countnes of formcr Yugoslavra to
move closer to the Europcan Uruon m order to
recelve the financral assrstance necessary for
reburldrng therr economrcs. Croatia rn pafticular
has a spccral rnterest rn not being treated on the
same footmg as Belgrade and in becoming a
l0 Internahonal flerald Tnbune. 23 September
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mcmber of the Council of Europe and moung
closer to the European Union as soon as possrble
To that end, every means should be emploved to
erert pressure on croatra to rcnounce an)'
hngering asprrations to subsume thc Croat areas
of Bosnra and Herzegovma
39. The hftrng of the arms cmbargo dccreed
b1, the l,lN Securrtl' Councrl rvas sub.;ect to the
conclusron of an arms control agreement betn'een
rcpresentatrves of the Federal Repubhc of
Yugoslaua. Bosnra and Herzegovrna and its trvo
entrtres. and Croatra as part of the regronal
stabilisatron measurcs prol'rded for in the Dayton
Accords. Thrs agrcemcnt x'as srgned on 14 June
1996 and thc Sccurrtv Councrl accordinglv hfted
the arms embargo
40. It should hou'ever be stressed that the arms
control agreement onl1' concerns the apphcatron
of Artrcle IV of Annex 1-B to the Darton
Accords. on sub-regtonal arms control. On thc
other hand, no progress has 1'et been madc on
arms control at regronal level. the sub.;ect of
Article V of the Annex Undcr the terms of the
latter. the OSCE is to assist by dcsrgnatrng a
specral representatlve to hclp organlse and
conduct ncgotratrons undcr the ausplces of the
OSCE Forum on Sccuritv Cooperatron with the
goal of estabhshrng a rcgronal balance m and
around former Yugoslal'ra In addrtron, the
parties agrcc to estabhsh a commlsslon, together
rvrth reprcscntatl\,'es of the OSCE. for the
purpose of facrlrtatrng the resolution of an1-
disputes that mrght arise So far hotvever. the
spccial representatrve has not been designated
and thc commissron has not been estabhshed
41. Accordrng to mformation rssued b),
Agence France Presse on l8 June. the hftrng of
the embargo also entailed suspendrng the Sharp
Guard naval monitonng operatron that NATO
and WEU had been conductrng for three vcars ln
the Adnatrc Horvcver. thc German
Government's six-monthlv report on WEU
activitres from I January to 30 June 199611 grves
the follou ing mformatron:
"WEU conturued to carn, out the naval
morutormg operatlon Sharp Guard rr
conlunctron ruth NATO Follouing France's
urthdrau'al on l8 June 1996, all the
ll. Drucksache 13/5163,28 August 1996
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remalrung member states decrdcd to contmue
the operatton on a reduccd scale untrl the
elections m Bosrua and Hcrzegovna had
been held Surce mrd-Julr' 1992, over 74 300
boats have been stopped or challenged Of
thesc over 5 900 u'ere urspectcd and more
than I 400 dverted to Itahan ports for more
detarled mspectlons. The opcratron \\'as
suspended earlv m Jull' 1996."
42 Wrth reference to controls along the
Danubc. thc German Govemment informed the
Bundestag that
"Pohce and customs officers of the WEU
member states contmucd successfullv to
assrst the npanim states of the Danube 
-
Bulgana, Hungary and Romarua 
- 
rn their
task of morutonng and enforcrrg the arms
embargo the Unrtcd Nations rmposed on
Serbra and Montenegro m formcr Yugoslavia
and ensunng comphancc urth rt Srnce that
embargo rvas lifted m accordancc urth the
terms laid do*n b1' Uruted Nattons Sccuntv
Councrl Resoluilon l02l (1995). tho
operatlon ls contrnurng srth a small
contmgent of officers. tils rs rntended to kcep
up pressure so that the Dayton Accords arc
rmplemented Betrveen the start of thc
opcratron, rn June 1993. and 30 June 1996
more than 6 700 shipping convovs \\-ere
rnspected "
43. It x'as not until 2 October that WEU
publicll' amounccd the end of the operatron to
enforce the embargo on the Danubc
"The WEU Councrl has decrdcd to end the
Westem European Uruon (WELI) Danube
embargo enforcement opcratton follourng the
termmatron of the UN economrc sanctrons
agarnstthe Federal Rcpubhc of Yugoslana
In Apnl 1993. WEU membcr statcs
proposed to provrde assrstance to Bulgana,





rn their efforts to enforce the UN
sanctrons on the Danube. [n June, the threc
npanan statcs accepted tlus offer and agreed
ii-rth WEU on the settrng-up of a police and
customs operatron on the Danube.
The Danube operatlon, dunng ufuch 6 748
rnspectlon chccks u'ere carried out and w-llch
led to the drscovcn, of 422 supposed
embargo rnfringements. helped to create the
condrtrons for the Peace Agreement currentlv
beurg implemented m Bosrua and
Herzegor.rna.
Thc Danube operatron is the first practrcal
cxample of concrete cooperatlon belrcen
WEU and associate partners "
44 Also on 2 October, WEU and NATO
rssued a.;ornt communrqud announcrng the end of
Operatron Sharp Guard (consrderrng that thrs
operatron. thc first thel'had carned out together,
had proved that the tuo organrsations had
strengthencd thcrr hnks and mcreased
cooperatron)
45 The German Government's rcport on WEU
actrvrtres, referred to carlrcr. provtdes the
follourng information about the WEU pohce
force in Mostar:
"To support the Europcan Uruon's
admmrstratron of the toun of Mostar, WEU
has marrtamed a presence m the toun ulth a
contmgent of some 175 pohce officers 65 of
u'hom are German The amval of about 100
Croat and Mushm officers as rerrforcemcnt
has made rt possrble to form the core of a
urufied pohce forcc for Mostar consrsturg of
ll7 pohce officers from the eastem part of
thc toun and 78 from the westem Croat
sector "
The WEU Councrl decrded to end the remrt of the
WEU pohce force m Mostar from 15 October 1996
and to repatnate thc rcspectrve contmgents from rts
member countries
46. The situatron at prcsent can thcrcfore be
summed up as follou's' efforts to consohdate thc
loint rnstitutrons of Bosnra and Herzcgovrna and
makc them viable are onlv bcgrnnrng and are
running up against strong resistance and malor
problems, u-hrle most of the crvrhan oblectives of
the peace agreements have not been achreved and
thc srtuatron rn the country as a x'hole remains
fragilc and tcnse Yet no decrsion has becn taken
on an extensron of IFOR's mlsslon. the content of
rts mandate or the srze of forces m Bosrua.
Whrle thc WEU pohce force is preparing to leave
Mostar. there ls nothrng to prove that
estabhshmcnt of thc Unrted National
lnternatlonal pohce task forcc. provrded for in
Annex I I to the Dayton Accords. rvrll actuall1'be
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an effectrve contribution to the country''s
stabilisation
III. Search for an appropriate strategy
for completing the peace process
1. A common concept to give Bosnia
s e lf- s u st ain e d st a b i I ity
47 If it is hoped to estabhsh rn thc Balkans an
order that rs stable, peaceful and prosperous. it rs
rmportant to agree both on a plan and the
approprrate means for its rmplementatron.
According to information in vour Rapporteur's
possesslon, the Contact Group, strll the driving
force in the overall peace process concept, rs
pursuing the goal of bringrng "self-sustamed
stabrlrtt," to Bosnra and Herzegovlna, so that rn
the long run the countn' urll not have to relv on
foreign pressure. or aid, in order to put rts orm
house in order. It rs unrversallv agreed that this
oblectrve rs a long sav off being achrcved thrs
r,'ear and that thc rnternatronal communrtl' rvill
have to go on providrng assrstancc to Bosnia and
Herzegovma next vear, urthout rt berng posstble
to prcdict at thrs pornt lust rrhen rts commitment
lvill cease. Thc same also holds truc for the
rnternatronal communitv's military involvement.
48 Equallr'. rt rs most important that
"strategic unrty" be mamtamed u'rthrn thc
intcrnatronal communitv rnl,olved rn the peacc
process, partrcularlv among the Europeans.
Amencans and Russians For vears Bosrua has
suffcred abomrnably on account of drfferences
betrreen Europe and America as to rrhat actron
to take rn the Balkans. and the Wcst only, began
to pull togcther rn strategic terms rvhen the
Unrted States decrded on a mrlitan' commitment,
by sendrng rn ground troops to put an cnd to the
fighting This strategrc urutv has to be
maintarned m thc comrng ),ear and rt rs vital to
prevent the Amerrcans from making a lvholesale
u'ithdrarval of therr troops from Bosnian
territorl'.
49. The NATO dcfence ministers arc studung
the various optlons for a ncw mandate for a post-
IFOR force (IFOR Follo*'-on-Force or FO-FOR)
but no decisron rs to bc expected before the
American prcsidentlal electrons Hou'evcr,
according to press reportsl2. US troops began
12 [,e Ftgaro and the Internatronal llerald Trtbune.
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pulhng out of Bosnra on 9 October 1996. A
protectlon force of some 7 500 Amcrrcan troops.
u'hrch is to rcmam in Bosnia untrl March 1997,
appears to have bcen grven the task of overseemg
the rvrthdrasal.
50. There seems. ncverthelcss. to be agreement
urthin NATO that IFOR numbers should not be
substantrally' scaled doun before the munrcrpal
clectrons due to be hcld in late November 1996
In anv event it nrll be partrcularlv diffrcult to
definc a ne\v mandate for a force that is not an
occupr,rng forcc Ho*'evcr NATO mtnlsters
asking for a u'ider mandatc for mrlrtan,personncl
to arrcst those accuscd of x'ar cnmes are strll in a
mrnontr'. The Internatronal Commrssron on the
Balkans estabhshed by the Camegre Endoument
for International Pcacc has therefore recentlv
proposed that the Internatronal War Crimcs
Trrbunal rn The Hague should tn'those accuscd
of rvar crlmes. if necessary, rn therr absencer3
5l The mrlitan'prescnce apart. agreement has
also to be reached on other forms of pressure
xhich can bc applied rf nccessarl'on onc or more
of the partres involved. Folloiving the pcrmanent
hfting of cconomrc sanctlons and the arrns
embargo, lt mav provc necessan' for sanctions to
be replaced bv a mechanrsm u'hereb!' economrc
and financral pressure can bc apphed For
cxample, rt might be possrble to set vcry' specific
conditrons for the parmcnt of large sums
allocated to the parties mvolved b1' the World
Bank and other donor organlsatlons
52 In vieu' of the considerable mfluence rt
exerclses or,'er developments ln eastcrn Slavonra.
Bosnia and Herzegovrna and also rn Kosovo.
Vo.;vodrna and Sand.1ak. it has to be brought
home, if necessan'. to the Fcderal Repubhc of
Yugoslal'ra that thc hftrng of cconomic sanctions
does not in rtself mean resumptron of forcign
tnvestmcnt m the countn' nor lts automatic rsturn
to the fold rn all the rnternational organisations
rvhich have temporarilv suspended rts
membcrship. but that cverythrng depends on the
good u'rll rt demonstrates rn rmplcmenting all the
agreements and dischargrng all the obhgatrons rt
has entered mto.
53. In a drfferent context, Croatra must bc
made to rcahsc that its accesslon to the Council
ll
13 Internatrcnal Herald Trtbune.8 October 1996
DOCT]MENT I54O
of Europc and closer links rvrth the European
Uruon ri'ill depend on it cooperalng
constructrvell' rn rmplemcntmg the agrecments
All the vanous components of formcr Yugoslavta
arc rn sorc need of Europcan Unton economtc atd
and have even' rncentrl'e to establtsh tres rvrth thc
Unron Thc lattcr thus has an effectrve levcr for
applvrng pressure. especrallr'' slnce economlc
matters fall u'ithrn the pun'tov of the tuo enttttes
of the Repubhc of Bosnra and Herzegovtna
Thus the European Union can. if necessan'.
rmposc upon thcm condtttons governlng anv
grant ofard sought
54 Whrlc rt u'ould therefore not be realtstrc to
envtsagc the untficatton of Bosnta and
Hcrzegovma tn mtlttan' and defence terms in the
foreseeable future. economlc factors. such as
forcrgn rnvcstment. together u'tth an tmprovement
in socral condrttons and 
.1ob crcatton could *'ell
havc a maJor part to plal' tn promotmg
intcgratron and coopcratton betu'een the tu'o state
entrtres.
55 Among problems requlnng urgent
resolutton. the follourng arc rvorthv of partrcular
note First and foremost. tt ts cssenttal to create
urthout further delal' the condtttons that u'ill
allou'refugecs and drsplaced persons to return to
therr homcs. Thc financral burden and
organlsational difficultres those European
countrtes u'hich have taken tn thc largest
numbcrs of refugees are havmg to contcnd rvtth
are ven'grcat rndced Nevertheless thc refugces
cannot be sent back to the country of thcir brrth
and abandoned to their fate urthout the assurance
of decent ltlrng condrtions and unfettered
frcedom of movemcnt.
56. Another problem rs that of pursurng a
ratronal policl' ln terms of lornt admmtstratton of
the multr-ethntc touns Thts anscs mamly tn
Mostar and Saralcvo, but the same pnnctplcs
should appl)' rn other torr-ns such as. for
example. Foca, Vrscgrad. Barya Luka and even
Srebrenrca
57 . The case of the toun of Brcko ls more
comphcated strll. smcc the problem thcre is not
onlv a matter of settrng up a form of arbttratton
acceptable to all the parttes concerned but also of
solvrng the difficultres of 
.1ornt admrntstratton
Accordrng to press reportsr*. it is hoped to set up
an internatronal admmtstration for the toun,
possrbll, under United Natrons ausplces, takrng
Mostar as a model and drau'mg on cxpencnce
garncd therc Indeed. rt is fcared that Brcko mav
continue to be one of the most explosive
flashpornts rn the uholc of Bosnra As far as the
Scrbs are concerncd. the Brcko corridor rs all-
important for keeping the tu'o parts of the
Repubhka Srpska together
58 In this contcxt, thc settrng-up of the Unrted
Nations Internattonal Pohce Task Force (IPTF)
provrded for tn Anncx 1 1 of thc Darton Accords
is apparcnth'provlng a real hcadache. There ts
first the diffrcultv of estabhshtng a homogenous
force because of the large number of countncs
mvolved and sccond. mant' of them are hal'lng
drfficultv m recrutttng and asstgnmg to the force
officcrs u'ho are adequatell tramed for the
sensltlve tasks that au'att them. The police forcc
has not been partrcularlv effccttve to date
because rt ts unarmed and has no enforccment
powers.
59. In the light of thc role plavcd b1'the WEU
pohce force tn the admrnistratton of Mostar. the
WEU Councrl should glve serlous and prompt
considcratron to rcplacrng the IPTF u'ith a more
substantral WEU force *'hrch could be made
avarlablc xherever the cstabhshment of a multi-
ethnic crvrltan admmtstration rcqutred thc
formatron and trammg of a unrfied poltce force.
as rn the casc of Mostar Thrs WEU force could
moreover bc uscd to protect the ctvtltan
admmrstratton
2. Eastern Slavonia and the hevlaka peninsula
60. As far as the sttuatton ln eastern Slavonra
is concerned. thrngs seem to bc settling doun
thanks to asststancc from INTAES, uhrch
completed demrlttansatton of the rcglon on
20 June 1996. Once agarn. thc matter of the
rcturn of drsplaced pcrsons strll has to be settled
Furthcrmore. on 15 August. the Unrted Nattons
Secuntv Councrl rcmrnded Croatra of lts
obligatron to adopt a larv granttng amnestl'to all
persons havmg u'orked rn administrative posts tn
local Serb communtttcs. u'rth thc exccptron of
those gurlty' of u'ar crimes rrrthin the meaning of
internatronal lau' In thc normal course of events,
the mandate of UNTAES is due to exptre on
15 January 1997 It rs also tntercsttng in thrs
connection to note the efforts UNTAES has madel1 Dte ll'elt- 12 Scptembcr 1996
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to estabhsh a temporary' pohce force rvhrch rvrll
be rcsponsrblc prrmanlr' for public order
maintcnance. operatrng under the authorrtv of the
Transrtronal Administration and supcrvtsed bv a
Unrted Natrons crvrhan pohce force In ucu' of
the observations madc rn thc foregorng paragraph
and current developments rn the rcgron. WEU
could also offer rtsclf as a replacement for thc
LN bl, sendrng a pohce force to eastern Slavonta
6l The srtuatron m castern Slavonia is also
hnked to more general dcvelopmcnts in rclattons
betn'een Belgradc and Zagreb. rvhich havc
rcccntlv re-estabhshed drplomatrc rclattons
Belgrade contrnucs to Ia1, clatm to thc Prcvlaka
perunsula In thrs connection. reference should
be madc to Unitcd Natrons Securrtr Councrl
Resolutron 1066 dated 15 Julv 1996. rn n'hrch
the Sccunty Councrl remrnds both partres of thcrr
commrtment to dcmilrtanse the Prevlaka
penrnsula and authorrses Unrtcd Natrons mrlrtary
observers to contrnue to monrtor demrlrtarrsatton
untrl l5 Januan' 1997
3. Kosovo, Vojvodina and Sandjak
62 Thc situatron in Kosovo. Vo.lvodrna and
Sandlak has not rmproved and thc OSCE mrssion
to these areas \\'as suspcndcd u'hen Belgrade rvas
excluded from partrcipatron m the organrsatron's
meetmgs Hou'cvcr. accordmg to some sources.
the Federal Repubhc of Yugoslavra u'ould bc
preparcd to acccpt a European Uruon presence rn
Kosovo. u'here there rs alreadv a Unrtcd Statcs
cultural office An accommodatron must
therefore be reached u'rth Mr Milosevrc that
could lead to hrs country bcrng readmrtted to the
OSCE rf he agrees to the organisatron resumlng
rts mrssion rn the areas in question For thrs to
happen. he must be persuaded that the arm is not
drvrde the countn' but to crcate a true federal
repubhc
4. C onjidence- an d security-b uilding mea su res
63 In one partrcular field. that of the OSCE's
attempts to rmplement confidencc- and sccuritr'-
burlding measurcs m Bosnia and Herzegovlna.
1'our Rapporteur rs conr,'rnced that a far greater
cffort rs necessan', on the basrs of the orrgrnal
agreemcnt srgncd on 3l Januarv 1996 betu'een
thc entrtres of Bosnia and Herzcgovina Such an
effort should rn partrcular be drrected tou'ards
mrlrtan' cooperatron. u'hrch mcludcs lornt
mrlitary exerclses and trarnrng. exchanges of
experts. semlnars to promotc mrlrtary
cooperation. informatron exchange. recrprocal
visrts to mrlrtan' bascs. etc ln this connectron.
attentron ls drarvn to paragraph 3 of
Recommendatron 598. adopted rn June 1996
u'hich recommendcd that the WEU Council
"Actrvelv support OSCE efforts to
rmplcment confidencc- and secuntr'-building
measures ur Bosrua and Herzegonna by'
(a) askrng the WEU lnstrtutc for Sccuntl'
Studres to offcr rts hclp to thc OSCE
Centre for Conflrct Preventon to
organlsc semmars as prolrded b1' thc
agrccmcnts on cooperatton bchr,een the
armcd forces of the cntrtrcs of Bosnia
and Hcrzcgovma.
@ offenng thc OSCE and the Goremment
of the Rcpubhc of Bosrua and
Herzegonna WEU's asststance ln
developrng a prograrnme for
cooperatron behveen the armed forces
of its entrtres. urth thc long-tcrm
ob.lectrvc of transfernng all defonce-
rclated responsrbilrtrcs to the
Govemment of thc Repubhc of Bosrua
and Herzegonna".
61 To date, thc Councrl has not rephed to this
Recommendatron Yet thc issue ts all the more
rmportant ln vle\\ of the fact that. accordrng to
thc latest reports in the p.css't, Scrb and
Mushm-Croat forces arc contrnurng to hrdc many'
more \\'eapons than thcl' admrt and the process of
\\'eapons destruction has not 1'et begun ln earncst
Thrs state of affarrs. far from buildrng
confidoncc. further sen'es to demonstratc that thc
arms control agreements havc not genurnelt,becn
implemented
IV Conclusions
65 After a grcat deal of drthenng and after
ovcrcomlng manv drfferences of oprnion. the
rnternatronal commurutr' finalh' took the dectsron.
under thc ausplccs of thc Unrtcd States and
NATO. to enforce pcace rn Bosnra and
Hcrzegovina and the other parts of former
13
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Yugoslavra ravaged br. the uar In the rvakc of
the clectrons of 14 September. some obsen'ers
are askmg u,hcther thcrc rs anr' ;ustrficatron for
procccdmg urth pcacc cnforccment,
66 Your Rapportcur consrders rt u'ould be
rrresponsrble and srmphstrc to rntcrpret the
results of these first electrons as a refcrendum rn
favour of the partrtron of Bosnra and
Herzegovrna He therefore advocates the
continuatron of the proccss that began at Darton
and. rn vreu' of the pcrsrstmg fragrlrtl' of thc
srtuation. favours mamtarning a mrlitan' presencc
rncludrng a contlngent of US ground troops
Indeed. therr presence rs essential rf the
populatron rs to bc givcn a guarantee that the
crvrhan aspect of the Darton Accords can be
rmplemented rn a chmatc of sccuritv and trust.
devord of anv form of rntrmidatron
67 As regards WEU. rt u'ould bc u'rong to
thrnk that the end of the Sharp Guard and
Danubc operatrons. togcther urth the dcparturc
of the WEU pohce forcc from Mostar. mean that
these tasks have nou. finrshed rn the Balkans On
thc contran. rn vlc\\ of the expenence WEU has
acqurred on the ground and the consrdcrable
progress rt has contrnued to makc m order to
bccome opcratronal. there rs a need for rt to plal'
an cvcn more actrve part in the polrtrcal solutrons
and to propose rts good offices more insrstcntlr'
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